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PillarBox: Combating Next-Generation Malware with Fast Forward-Secure Logging

  • Kevin D. Bowers
  • Catherine Hart
  • Ari Juels
  • Nikos Triandopoulos
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8688)

Abstract

Security analytics is a catchall term for vulnerability assessment and intrusion detection leveraging security logs from a wide array of Security Analytics Sources (SASs), which include firewalls, VPNs, and endpoint instrumentation. Today, nearly all security analytics systems suffer from a lack of even basic data protections. An adversary can eavesdrop on SAS outputs and advanced malware can undetectably suppress or tamper with SAS messages to conceal attacks.

We introduce PillarBox, a tool that enforces integrity for SAS data even when such data is buffered on a compromised host within an adversarially controlled network. Additionally, PillarBox (optionally) offers stealth, concealing SAS data and potentially even alerting rules on a compromised host. Using data from a large enterprise and on-host performance measurements, we show experimentally that PillarBox has minimal overhead and is practical for real-world systems.

Keywords

Security analytics forward-secure logging log integrity and secrecy self-protecting alerting secure chain of custody 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin D. Bowers
    • 1
  • Catherine Hart
    • 2
  • Ari Juels
    • 3
  • Nikos Triandopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.RSA LaboratoriesCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Bell CanadaVancouverCanada
  3. 3.Cornell Tech (Jacobs Institute)New YorkUSA

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