Necessity of Thought

  • Cesare CozzoEmail author
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 7)


The concept of “necessity of thought” plays a central role in Dag Prawitz’s essay “Logical Consequence from a Constructivist Point of View”. The theme is later developed in various articles devoted to the notion of valid inference. In Sect. 4.1 I explain how the notion of necessity of thought emerges from Prawitz’s analysis of logical consequence. I try to expound Prawitz’s views concerning the necessity of thought in Sects. 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. In Sects. 4.5 and 4.6 I discuss some problems arising with regard to Prawitz’s views.


Logical consequence Deductive necessity Inferential compulsion Valid inference Grounds 


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dipartimento di FilosofiaRomeItaly

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