Tacit Knowledge Awareness and Its Role in Improving the Decision-Making Process in International Negotiations

  • E. Thomas Dowd


This chapter describes several constructs of tacit knowledge that underlie the negotiation process. These include the negotiators’ culture, their religion, their native language, and the epistemologies (ways of knowing) and cognitive heuristics (cognitive rules) they use. Universal human cognitive constructs, such as comparison and contrast, and the relative use of System 1 and System 2 in thinking processes are also discussed. Implications from these ideas for international negotiations are then described as well as the tentative framework of a training program for negotiators based on these constructs.


Tacit Knowledge Negotiation Process Religious Orientation International Negotiation Tacit Assumption 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kent State UniversityKentUSA

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