Feeling and Value, Willing and Action

Volume 216 of the series Phaenomenologica pp 93-103


Intentionality of Moods and Horizon Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology

  • Ignacio Quepons RamírezAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, Seattle University Email author 

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The aim of this chapter is to explain the intentionality of moods through the idea of horizon-consciousness, as according to Husserl’s phenomenology. In order to do this, I point to some aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological description of moods in different moments of his work: namely, from the texts written before the Logische Untersuchungen, to the unpublished manuscripts of Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, as well as other texts from the Nachlass. Following this, I argue for a description of moods as emotional meaning references according to the model of phenomenological analysis of intentional horizons and its connections according to Husserl’s Philosophy.