The Professional Partnership: An Alternative Model for Public University Governance Reform



We propose an alternative model for university governance reform; namely, the professional partnership. To this end, we provide a theoretical foundation to support the propositions that the profession, as institution, and the partnership, as organizational form, have unique governance characteristics that are more effective for knowledge-intensive organizations, such as universities, than the corporate model of governance, on which the New-Public-Management-inspired governance model for German public universities, the so-called Neues Steuerungsmodell, is based.


Corporate Governance Knowledge Worker Governance Feature Transaction Cost Theory Professional Norm 



We are grateful for financial support provided by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF grant no. 01PW11015). All opinions expressed herein are those of the authors.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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