The Professional Partnership: An Alternative Model for Public University Governance Reform

Chapter

Abstract

We propose an alternative model for university governance reform; namely, the professional partnership. To this end, we provide a theoretical foundation to support the propositions that the profession, as institution, and the partnership, as organizational form, have unique governance characteristics that are more effective for knowledge-intensive organizations, such as universities, than the corporate model of governance, on which the New-Public-Management-inspired governance model for German public universities, the so-called Neues Steuerungsmodell, is based.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyKarlsruheGermany

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