Keynote Talk: Communication Without Repudiation: The Unanswered Question

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8593)


A non-repudiation protocol is to be executed by two parties, say \(S\) and \(R\), in order to (1) enable \(S\) to send some text to \(R\) then receive some non-repudiated evidence that \(R\) has indeed received the text, and (2) enable \(R\) to receive both the sent text from \(S\) and some non-repudiated evidence that this text was indeed sent from \(S\) to \(R\). Since 1995, tens of non-repudiation protocols have been proposed, but every one of these protocols seems to suffer from one or more well-known problems. For example, most protocols assume the existence of a third party that is trusted by both \(S\) and \(R\). This observation reminds us that the following core question has never been answered. Can there be a non-repudiation protocol that does not suffer from any of these problems?


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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