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A Conference Management System with Verified Document Confidentiality

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8559)

Abstract

We present a case study in verified security for realistic systems: the implementation of a conference management system, whose functional kernel is faithfully represented in the Isabelle theorem prover, where we specify and verify confidentiality properties. The various theoretical and practical challenges posed by this development led to a novel security model and verification method generally applicable to systems describable as input–output automata.

Keywords

Security Model Program Committee Safety Property Epistemic Logic Paper Authorship 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fakultät für InformatikTechnische Universität MünchenGermany

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