Low Entropy Masking Schemes, Revisited
Low Entropy Masking Schemes (LEMS) are a recent countermeasure against side-channel attacks. They aim at reducing the randomness requirements of masking schemes under certain (adversarial and implementation) conditions. Previous works have put forward the interest of this approach when such conditions are met. We complement these investigations by analyzing LEMS against adversaries and implementations that deviate from their expected behavior, in a realistic manner. Our conclusions are contrasted: they confirm the theoretical interest of the countermeasure, while suggesting that its exploitation in actual products may be risky, because of hard(er) to control hardware assumptions.
KeywordsGaussian Mixture Modeling Information Leakage Information Theoretic Security Guarantee Leakage Model
Work funded in parts by the European Commission through the ERC project 280141 (acronym CRASH) and the European ISEC action grant HOME/2010/ISEC/AG/INT-011 B-CCENTRE project. F.-X. Standaert is an associate researcher of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS-F.R.S.).
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