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Manipulating the Frame Information with an Underflow Attack

  • Emilie Faugeron
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8419)

Abstract

This paper presents an underflow attack performed on Java Card platforms. This underflow is based on the dup_x instruction that can be used in order to read and modify the current context of execution of the attacker’s application. We first detail the theoretical and practical attack path by describing the method that can be used to characterize the platform and exploit the obtained information. Secondly, we show how it is possible to set up this underflow attack in a way that makes it bypass the current concept of Byte Code Verifier. Finally, we describe some countermeasures that can be implemented to prevent this kind of attack.

Keywords

Malicious application Underflow Java Card Open Platform 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Thales Communications and SecurityToulouse Cedex 9France

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