Secure Auctions without Cryptography

  • Jannik Dreier
  • Hugo Jonker
  • Pascal Lafourcade
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8496)


An auction is a simple way of selling and buying goods. Modern auction protocols often rely on complex cryptographic operations to ensure manifold security properties such as bidder-anonymity or bid-privacy, non-repudiation, fairness or public verifiability of the result. This makes them difficult to understand for users who are not experts in cryptography. We propose two physical auction protocols inspired by Sako’s cryptographic auction protocol. In contrast to Sako’s protocol, they do not rely on cryptographic operations, but on physical properties of the manipulated mechanical objects to ensure the desired security properties. The first protocol only uses standard office material, whereas the second uses a special wooden box. We validate the security of our solutions using ProVerif.


Security Property Cryptographic Protocol Cryptographic Primitive Vote Protocol Auction Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jannik Dreier
    • 1
  • Hugo Jonker
    • 2
  • Pascal Lafourcade
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Institute of Information Security, Department of Computer ScienceETH ZurichSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  3. 3.Clermont Université, Université d’Auvergne, LIMOSClermont-FerrandFrance
  4. 4.CNRS, UMR 6158, LIMOSAubièreFrance

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