New Modular Compilers for Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Yong Li
  • Sven Schäge
  • Zheng Yang
  • Christoph Bader
  • Jörg Schwenk
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8479)

Abstract

We present two new compilers that generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries. Security is shown in a very strong security model where the adversary is also allowed to i) reveal state information of the protocol participants and ii) launch theoretically and practically important PKI-related attacks that model important classes of unknown-key share attacks. Although the security model is much stronger, our compilers are more efficient than previous results with respect to many important metrics like the additional number of protocol messages and moves, the additional computational resources required by the compiler or the number of additional primitives applied. Moreover, we advertise a mechanism for implicit key confirmation. From a practical point of view, the solution is simple and efficient enough for authenticated key exchange. In contrast to previous results, another interesting aspect that we do not require that key computed by the key exchange protocol is handed over to the compiler what helps to avoid additional and costly modifications of existing KE-based systems.

Keywords

Protocol Compiler Authenticated Key Exchange Security Model 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yong Li
    • 1
  • Sven Schäge
    • 2
  • Zheng Yang
    • 1
    • 3
  • Christoph Bader
    • 1
  • Jörg Schwenk
    • 1
  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-University BochumGermany
  2. 2.University College LondonUnited Kingdom
  3. 3.Chongqing University of TechnologyChina

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