Coalitions, which allow traders to form teams in e-markets, can sometimes accomplish things more efficiently than individuals. Concepts and algorithms for coalition formation have drawn much attention from academics and practitioners. However, most of coalitions are unstable and fall apart easily. The core has become a popular solution, because it provides a way to find stable sets. However its problems hinder researchers from applying it to a real world market. This paper proposes a core-based group-trading model, which involves bundle selling of goods, offering amount discount in group-buying in e-markets. Its outcome is compared with a traditional market under the scenario of a travel agent and is evaluated in terms of five criteria: the use of distributed computing, the degree of computational complexity, incentive compatibility, efficiency and effectiveness.


Broker Core Coalition E-Market Shapley Value 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pen-Choug Sun
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Information ManagementAletheia UniversityNew Taipei CityTaiwan, R.O.C.

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