Vulnerability of Social Norms to Incomplete Information

Chapter
Part of the Computational Social Sciences book series (CSS)

Abstract

The ability of groups to self-govern their common pool resources is well documented (Ostrom, 1990). Whether common pool resources are fish stocks or freshwater or forest products, success of self-governance relates to the ability of appropriators to develop trust relationships, monitor and enforce agreements, and communicate among each other.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for the Study of Institutional DiversityArizona State UniversityTempeUSA
  2. 2.Workshop in Political Theory and Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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