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Permissible Preventive Cyberwar: Restricting Cyber Conflict to Justified Military Targets

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Part of the book series: Law, Governance and Technology Series ((LGTS,volume 14))

Abstract

Evaluations of cyber war and weapons range from denunciations of their widespread and indiscriminate destructiveness and deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, all the way to appraisals of cyber warfare as a morally preferable, less destructive alternative to conventional warfare. This chapter will bring some order to this chaos by distinguishing permissible from impermissible forms of cyber conflict, as well as distinguishing genuine “warfare” from large-scale criminal or terrorist enterprises. The chapter will criticize the lack of discrimination often encountered in the formulation of cyber strategy and development of cyber weapons, and argue in favor of international governance and guidance that (with reference to proportionality, discrimination, and the principle of last resort) restricts the use of cyber weapons to justified military targets, using Stuxnet as a recent case in point. In ethics, we can infer or derive operable constraints on, and guidelines for acceptable practice by examining instances of what all agree is either good or bad practice, just as in international law, we recognize the evolution of customary law through the accepted conduct of otherwise law-abiding states. Hence, I will argue that an act of cyberwarfare is permissible if it aims primarily at harming military (rather than civilian) infrastructure, degrades an adversary’s ability to undertake highly destructive offensive operations, harms no civilians and/or destroys little or no civilian infrastructure in the process, and is undertaken as a “last resort” in the sense that all reasonable alternatives short of attack have been attempted to no avail, and further delay would only make the situation worse.

The original version of this paper was delivered at a UNESCO-sponsored conference on Cyber War and Ethics at the University of Hertfordshire (July 1, 2011): http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/Permissible%20Preventive%20Cyberwar%20UNESCO%202011.pdf.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    More recently, from the perspective of domestic and international law, I commend a keynote address by Steven Bradbury, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice, entitled “The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations,” delivered at the annual Harvard National Security Symposium in 2011, devoted to “Cybersecurity: Law, Privacy, and Warfare in a Digital World” (Bradbury 2011; see also Goldsmith 2011).

  2. 2.

    Comment of Ralph Langner, a computer security expert in Hamburg, Germany, quoted in NY Times (William et al. 2011).

  3. 3.

    This concern is voiced explicitly in the online “infographic” documentary, Clair (2011).

  4. 4.

    I have argued elsewhere (“Postmodern War,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 4 (2010): 296) that this tendency to target civilians in cyber conflict stems from the overwhelming influence of intelligence and espionage, or clandestine services communities in the formulation of strategy and development of weapons, as contrasted with the conventional war-fighting community (even though a preponderance of the participants, from General Keith Alexander and VADM William McCollough on down, wear (or wore) military uniforms). In espionage, covert action, and “psych ops,” there is no restriction on targeting civilians (although this has begun to be questioned in the intelligence community’s own discussions of professional ethics): See also Lucas 2013.

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Correspondence to George R. Lucas .

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Lucas, G. (2014). Permissible Preventive Cyberwar: Restricting Cyber Conflict to Justified Military Targets. In: Floridi, L., Taddeo, M. (eds) The Ethics of Information Warfare. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04135-3_5

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