A Logical Framework of Bargaining with Integrity Constraints
This paper proposes a logical framework for bargaining with integrity constraints (IC) in multi-agent and multi-issue bargaining environments. We construct a simultaneous concession solution for bargaining games under IC, and show that the solution is uniquely characterised by a set of logical properties. In addition, we prove that the solution also satisfies the most fundamental game theoretic properties such as symmetry and Pareto optimality. Finally, we discuss the relationship between merging operators and bargaining solutions under integrity constraints.
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