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Principles of Knowledge, Belief and Conditional Belief

  • Guillaume Aucher
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 3)

Abstract

We review and examine in this paper the validity of the different axioms (and inference rules) of knowledge and belief and relating knowledge to belief which have been proposed in the epistemic !epistemic logic literature. In doing so, we encounter many of the problems that epistemic !epistemic logic has had to face in its relatively short (modern) history and provide relevant pointers for more details. We also contribute to this area by providing conditions under which the notion of belief can be formally defined in terms of knowledge , and vice versa. We also prove that certain convoluted axioms dealing only with the notion of knowledge can be derived from understandable interaction axioms relating knowledge and conditional belief !conditional .

Keywords

Logic Logic Inference Rule Accessibility Relation Conditional Belief Epistemic Luck 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I thank Manuel Rebuschi and Franck Lihoreau for helpful comments on this paper. I also thank the anonymous English native speaker referee for detailed comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Rennes 1RennesFrance

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