Action, Failure and Free Will Choice in Epistemic stit Logic

Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 369)

Abstract

We study action, failure and free will choice in stit logic. We identify a failing action as a situation where there is a discrepancy between the objective act conducted by an agent and the choice the agent believes to be exercising. To model this in stit logic, we consider extensions with epistemic operators. We discuss several possible logical properties as candidates for a logic of choice, action and failure. Then we propose a definition of free will choice, which uses the distinction between objective action and subjective choice to account for the free will aspect of a choice. The properties of free will choice suggest a connection with so called Frankfurt examples. We investigate this link and discuss issues of determinism, compatibilism and moral responsibility in our context.

Keywords

Epistemic STIT logic Free will Logic of action Logic of choice 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Information and Computing SciencesUtrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands

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