Revisiting MAC Forgeries, Weak Keys and Provable Security of Galois/Counter Mode of Operation

  • Bo Zhu
  • Yin Tan
  • Guang Gong
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8257)

Abstract

Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is a block cipher mode of operation widely adopted in many practical applications and standards, such as IEEE 802.1AE and IPsec. We demonstrate that to construct successful forgeries of GCM-like polynomial-based MAC schemes, hash collisions are not necessarily required and any polynomials could be used in the attacks, which removes the restrictions of attacks previously proposed by Procter and Cid. Based on these new discoveries on forgery attacks, we show that all subsets with no less than two authentication keys are weak key classes, if the final block cipher masking is computed additively. In addition, by utilizing a special structure of GCM, we turn these forgery attacks into birthday attacks, which will significantly increase their success probabilities. Furthermore, we provide a method to fix GCM in order to avoid the security proof flaw discovered by Iwata, Ohashi and Minematsu. By applying the method, the security bounds of GCM can be improved by a factor of around 220. Lastly, we show that these forgery attacks will still succeed if GCM adopts MAC-then-Enc paradigm to protect its MAC scheme as one of the options mentioned in previous papers.

Keywords

Galois/Counter Mode GCM MAC forgery weak key birthday attack provable security MAC-then-Enc 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bo Zhu
    • 1
  • Yin Tan
    • 1
  • Guang Gong
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada

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