Doing Away with the No Miracles Argument

Conference paper
Part of the The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings book series (EPSP, volume 2)

Abstract

The recent debate surrounding scientific realism has largely focused on the “no miracles” argument (NMA). Indeed, it seems that most contemporary realists and anti-realists have tied the case for realism to the adequacy of this argument. I argue that it is mistake for realists to let the debate be framed in this way. Realists would be well advised to abandon the NMA altogether and pursue an alternative strategy, which I call the “local strategy”.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyJohn Carroll UniversityUniversity HeightsUSA

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