Blockchain Based Full Privacy Preserving Public Procurement

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12404)


Public procurement is one of the government activities most prone to corruption, and e-procurement systems have been recommended to increase transparency, outreach, and competition. Other benefits include ease of access to public tenders and easier detection of irregularities. One of the main challenges with the existing e-procurement/auction systems is ensuring bid privacy of the losing bidders and collusion between bidders and auctioneer. Most of the auction systems, proposed, depend either upon auctioneer(s) or on the trusted third party, which, according to us, is the biggest problem for addressing corruption. We propose a blockchain based solution for Public Procurement, which eliminates auctioneers/third-parties using secure multi-party computation (MPC). Our solution fully preserves bid privacy and is secure against malicious bidders.


Public Procurement Sealed-bid auction Multi-party computation Homomorphic encryption Blockchain Privacy 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research and DevelopmentTalentica Software (India) Pvt LtdPuneIndia

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