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The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12159)

Abstract

Electoral control models malicious ways of tampering with the outcome of elections via structural changes and has turned out to be one of the central themes in computational social choice. While the standard control types—adding/deleting/partitioning either voters or candidates—have been studied quite comprehensively, much less is known for the control actions of replacing voters or candidates. Continuing the work of Loreggia et al. [18, 19] and Erdélyi, Reger, and Yang [10], we study the computational complexity of control by replacing candidates or voters in Condorcet, fallback, and k-veto elections.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was supported in part by DFG grants RO-1202/14-2 and RO-1202/21-1.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für InformatikHeinrich-Heine-Universität DüsseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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