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Trustee: Full Privacy Preserving Vickrey Auction on Top of Ethereum

  • Hisham S. Galal
  • Amr M. YoussefEmail author
Conference paper
  • 31 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11599)

Abstract

The wide deployment of tokens for digital assets on top of Ethereum implies the need for powerful trading platforms. Vickrey auctions have been known to determine the real market price of items as bidders are motivated to submit their own monetary valuations without leaking their information to the competitors. Recent constructions have utilized various cryptographic protocols such as ZKP and MPC, however, these approaches either are partially privacy-preserving or require complex computations with several rounds. In this paper, we overcome these limits by presenting Trustee as a Vickrey auction on Ethereum which fully preserves bids’ privacy at relatively much lower fees. Trustee consists of three components: a front-end smart contract deployed on Ethereum, an Intel SGX enclave, and a relay to redirect messages between them. Initially, the enclave generates an Ethereum account and ECDH key-pair. Subsequently, the relay publishes the account’s address and ECDH public key on the smart contract. As a prerequisite, bidders are encouraged to verify the authenticity and security of Trustee by using the SGX remote attestation service. To participate in the auction, bidders utilize the ECDH public key to encrypt their bids and submit them to the smart contract. Once the bidding interval is closed, the relay retrieves the encrypted bids and feeds them to the enclave that autonomously generates a signed transaction indicating the auction winner. Finally, the relay submits the transaction to the smart contract which verifies the transaction’s authenticity and the parameters’ consistency before accepting the claimed auction winner. As part of our contributions, we have made a prototype for Trustee available on Github for the community to review and inspect it. Additionally, we analyze the security features of Trustee and report on the transactions’ gas cost incurred on Trustee smart contract.

Keywords

Sealed-bid auction Trusted Execution Environment Intel SGX Ethereum Blockchain 

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Concordia Institute for Information Systems EngineeringConcordia UniversityMontréalCanada

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