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Cognitive Penetrability

  • Luca MorettiEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

Keywords

Phenomenal conservatism Perceptual seemings Cognitive penetrability Perceptual justification Reliabilism  Inferentialism Proper function 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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