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Introduction

  • Luca MorettiEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Abstract

In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumptions of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.

Keywords

Phenomenal conservatism Phenomenal dogmatism Seemings Appearances Epistemic justification Epistemic internalism and externalism 

References

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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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