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Optimized Threshold Implementations: Minimizing the Latency of Secure Cryptographic Accelerators

  • Dušan BožilovEmail author
  • Miroslav Knežević
  • Ventzislav Nikov
Conference paper
  • 33 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11833)

Abstract

Threshold implementations have emerged as one of the most popular masking countermeasures for hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives. In this work, we first provide a generic construction for \(d+1\) TI sharing which achieves the minimal number of output shares for any n-input Boolean function of degree \(t=n-1\) and for any d. Secondly, we demonstrate the applicability of our results on a first-order and second-order \(d+1\) low-latency PRINCE implementation.

Keywords

Threshold implementations PRINCE SCA Masking 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Amir Moradi and Tobias Schneider for providing us with HDL code of PRINCE TI presented in [14]. Also we would like to thank the reviewers for helping us to improve the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dušan Božilov
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Miroslav Knežević
    • 1
  • Ventzislav Nikov
    • 1
  1. 1.NXP SemiconductorsLeuvenBelgium
  2. 2.COSIC KU Leuven and imecLeuvenBelgium

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