On Freedom

  • Vlad Beliavsky


Freedom is a common term in our everyday vocabulary. But what is it specifically? And how is it connected to our mental health? This chapter will introduce different freedom-related themes and shed some light on how they relate to our mental health and psychotherapy. We will discuss, in particular, the main views on free will (hard determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism), the belief in free will, the experience of freedom, freedom of action, and autonomy. I will argue, for one, that psychotherapy promotes various types of freedom by default. Moreover, it may be essential to sustain the belief in free will (at least a certain kind), as there is evidence that the disbelief in free will is associated with low mental well-being.


Free will Autonomy Freedom of action Hard determinism Compatibilism Libertarianism 


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© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vlad Beliavsky
    • 1
  1. 1.Psychology, PhilosophyUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK

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