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A Fast Characterization Method for Semi-invasive Fault Injection Attacks

  • Lichao Wu
  • Gerard Ribera
  • Noemie Beringuier-Boher
  • Stjepan PicekEmail author
Conference paper
  • 16 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12006)

Abstract

Semi-invasive fault injection attacks are powerful techniques well-known by attackers and secure embedded system designers. When performing such attacks, the selection of the fault injection parameters is of utmost importance and usually based on the experience of the attacker. Surprisingly, there exists no formal and general approach to characterize the target behavior under attack. In this work, we present a novel methodology to perform a fast characterization of the fault injection impact on a target, depending on the possible attack parameters. We experimentally show our methodology to be a successful one when targeting different algorithms such as DES and AES encryption and then extend to the full characterization with the help of deep learning. Finally, we show how the characterization results are transferable between different targets.

Keywords

Physical attacks Fault injection Fast space characterization Deep learning Metrics 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Delft University of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands
  2. 2.AmsterdamThe Netherlands

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