Bottom-Up State-Building

  • Jennifer MurtazashviliEmail author
  • Ilia Murtazashvili
Part of the Mercatus Studies in Political and Social Economy book series (MSPSE)


In failed states, many crises are institutional ones in which political institutions, economic institutions, and public infrastructure are weak or nonexistent. Despite these challenges posed by institutional crises in failed states, decentralized responses to institutional crises remain an important option. In such contexts, individuals and communities often find solutions to complex problems. Self-governance therefore provides an important option for state-building. We clarify under what conditions self-governance is expected to provide a framework for state-building. We use evidence from Afghanistan to illustrate the capacity for decentralized response and the limitations of centralized responses to institutional crises.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Public and International AffairsUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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