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Stit Semantics for Epistemic Notions Based on Information Disclosure in Interactive Settings

  • Aldo Iván Ramírez AbarcaEmail author
  • Jan Broersen
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 12005)

Abstract

We characterize four types of agentive knowledge using a stit semantics over branching discrete-time structures. These are ex ante knowledge, ex interim knowledge, ex post knowledge, and know-how. The first three are notions that arose from game-theoretical analyses on the stages of information disclosure across the decision making process, and the fourth has gained prominence both in logics of action and in deontic logic as a means to formalize ability. In recent years, logicians in AI have argued that any comprehensive study of responsibility attribution and blameworthiness should include proper treatment of these kinds of knowledge. This paper intends to clarify previous attempts to formalize them in stit logic and to propose alternative interpretations that in our opinion are more akin to the study of responsibility in the stit tradition. The logic we present uses an extension with knowledge operators of the Xstit language, and formulas are evaluated with respect to branching discrete-time models. We also present an axiomatic system for this logic, and address its soundness and completeness.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands

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