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Informal Constitutional Change and Political Law

  • Manon Altwegg-Boussac
Chapter
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Abstract

Informal constitutional change refers to a change in the normative meaning of the constitution, which occurs without following the procedure for constitutional revision. Theories of informal constitutional change often bolster the argument for a political approach to constitutional law that is sometimes described as “political law”—with a certain degree of ambiguity. In that way, constitutional law cannot be reduced to the study of the written constitution and its interpretation by a judge. Indeed, political law consider the political practice and constitutional interpretation. However, the political approach to constitutional law can pursue very different, more or less prescriptive, objectives since it serves at once to define the constitution, and produce certain representations of constitutional law.

Keywords

Informal constitutional change Material constitution Constitutional convention Constitutional customs Sovereignty of the People Realism Normativism Constitutional interpretation Political constitution Unwritten constitution 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manon Altwegg-Boussac
    • 1
  1. 1.Paris-Est Créteil UniversityParisFrance

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