The Different Faces of Politics: Economic Governance and European Democracy

  • Pedro Lomba


Against a depoliticized position that views the monetary union as the realm of epistocracy, strong economic and political bias and emergency decision-making, this contribution seeks to present the overall political and democratic challenges emerging from a more centralized, expert-based and politically sensitive European economic and monetary union. Courts are already responding to these challenges. Rather than interpreting democratic politics at the national and the European level as the two clashing forces preventing each other, the view is that both are part of a continuum of political ruling that requires political sensitivity, a sense of political purpose and overall transparency. For this also, economic governance cannot be seen only as the embodiment of strict rules and compliance procedures.


European economic and monetary union Eurozone Epistocracy Democratic politics Political legitimacy 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pedro Lomba
    • 1
  1. 1.Lisbon’s School of Law, Lisbon UniversityLisbonPortugal

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