• Roberto Gronda
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 421)


This chapter elaborates on the results reached in Chap.  2, and is devoted to the analysis of the functional elements through which scientific inquiry is carried out. Dewey is explicit that all the elements that are used in inquiry – and which he calls ‘propositions’ – are linguistic, and that taken together they contribute to the construction of the judgment that closes inquiry. I will reconstruct Dewey’s account of evidence, a priori knowledge, and objectivity, and I will show how the latter paves the way for the formulation of a strong form of scientific pluralism.


Judgment Synthetic Copula Predication Existential and universal propositions Evidence A priori Objectivity Logical notion Inferential stability Pluralism 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Gronda
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del SapereUniversità di PisaPisaItaly

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