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Electricity Market Pricing: Uniform Pricing vs. Pay-as-Bid Pricing

  • Alireza Akbari-DibavarEmail author
  • Behnam Mohammadi-Ivatloo
  • Kazem Zare
Chapter
  • 23 Downloads

Abstract

Selecting proper pricing rule is essential for the efficient operation of power markets. There are two main pricing rules in the existing power markets, namely uniform pricing (UP) and pay-as-bid (PAB) pricing. Among auction theorists, it is an unsolved question whether uniform pricing is superior to pay-as-bid pricing or the opposite. In this chapter, the aim is not to test various market benchmarks to answer the mentioned question; instead, the existing works relating introducing of and comparison between UP and PAB pricing schemes are reviewed, and the answer of the question is prescribed from each literature’s perspective.

Keywords

Electricity markets Restructured power systems Energy pricing Uniform auction Pay-as-bid auction Vickrey auction 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alireza Akbari-Dibavar
    • 1
    Email author
  • Behnam Mohammadi-Ivatloo
    • 1
  • Kazem Zare
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of TabrizTabrizIran

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