Evolution of Cooperation in E-commerce Based on Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Electronic commerce transactions often occur between strangers. Without any information about theirs counterparts, individuals feel puzzled to continue in transactions. Game theorists have formalized this problem as a prisoner’s dilemma and predict mutual noncooperation between sellers and vendors. This study investigates how failure in transactions between individuals affects electronic commerce exchanges and empower successful transactions between participants. For this purpose, we study the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) on scale-free networks and analyze the effect of failure. Individuals are represented by agents located on a vertices of a graph, whose edges define the network of contacts between those players. With the aid of the analysis of the PDG on a graph, we are able to investigate intuitively how the failure affects the transformation of individuals’ strategies. We find that the failure makes important changes in the structure of the graph, which induces considerable variation in the level of cooperation. As a result, our results show that failure inhibits the emergence and sustainment of the cooperation.
KeywordsElectronic commerce Evolution of cooperation Prisoner’s Dilemma Scale-free network
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