The Intergovernmental Safeguard: Principles of Design

  • Johanna SchnabelEmail author
Part of the Comparative Territorial Politics book series (COMPTPOL)


By distinguishing different principles of council design, this chapter outlines the conditions under which intergovernmental councils incentivize governments to coordinate public policy-making in such a way that protects governments’ autonomy so that federal stability is maintained. It argues that intergovernmental councils effectively protect the federal distribution of power if they process federally salient policy matters, are highly institutionalized, make binding resolutions, and if they are not dominated by the federal government. How these aspects of council design are operationalized and measured is also explained in the chapter. However, councils’ effectiveness as federal safeguards is also shaped by mechanisms and institutions outside the council system such as the party system, external pressure, or the federal spending power, which are also discussed.


Institutionalism Intergovernmental relations Federal spending power Coordination Collaboration 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Politics and International RelationsUniversity of KentCanterburyUK

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