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Cronus: Everlasting Privacy with Audit and Cast

  • Thomas HainesEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11875)

Abstract

We present a new online voting scheme with everlasting privacy and cast-as-intended verifiability. We follow the so called “audit-and-cast” paradigm where the voter audits the ballot before casting it. To mitigate the ability of this information to harm the voter’s privacy, we provide measures for avoiding coercion by allowing any party to create fake proofs for the content of any vote. We propose an efficient implementation and formally verify its security properties.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Norwegian University of Science and TechnologyTrondheimNorway

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