Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation
This chapter examines potential attack vectors that exist in a nuclear power plant and correlates the likelihood of an attack from each vector. The focus is on the boron monitoring system, which directly affects the reactivity in the core; cyber attacks on this system can lead to increased core wear, unsafe reactivity levels and poor power performance. A mockup model is developed using open-source software and hardware, which is tested to evaluate the potential of cyber attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack is implemented to demonstrate a cyber attack and its potential effects. Additionally, a redundancy-based cyber attack mitigation method is implemented using a hardware device that compares the input/output values of multiple programmable logic controllers. The approach for modeling general attack and defense steps is applicable to industrial control systems in the energy sector.
KeywordsNuclear power plants digital instrumentation and control security
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