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An Incident Response Model for Industrial Control System Forensics Based on Historical Events

  • Ken YauEmail author
  • Kam-Pui Chow
  • Siu-Ming Yiu
Conference paper
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 570)

Abstract

Cyber attacks on industrial control systems are increasing. Malware such as Stuxnet, Havex and BlackEnergy have demonstrated that industrial control systems are attractive targets for attackers. However, industrial control systems are not limited to malware attacks. Other attacks include SQL injection, distributed denial-of-service, spear phishing, social engineering and man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, methods such as unauthorized access, brute forcing and insider attacks have also targeted industrial control systems. Accidents such as fires and explosions at industrial plants also provide valuable insights into the targets of attacks, failure methods and potential impacts.

This chapter presents an incident response model for industrial control system forensics based on historical events. In particular, representative industrial control system incidents – cyber attacks and accidents – that have occurred over the past 25 years are categorized and analyzed.The resulting incident response model is useful for forensic planning and investigations. The model enables incident response teams and forensic investigators to decide on the expertise, techniques and tools to be applied to ensure sound evidence acquisition, analysis and reporting.

Keywords

Industrial control systems incident response forensics 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of HongHong KongChina

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