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New Opportunities for Compilers in Computer Security

  • Junjie Shen
  • Zhi Chen
  • Nahid Farhady Ghalaty
  • Rosario Cammarota
  • Alexandru Nicolau
  • Alexander V. VeidenbaumEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11882)

Abstract

Compiler techniques have been deployed to prevent various security attacks. Examples include mitigating memory access corruption, control flow integrity checks, race detection, software diversity, etc.

Hardware fault and side-channel attacks, however, are typically thought to require hardware protection. Attempts have been made to mitigate some timing and fault attacks via compiler techniques, but these typically adversely affected performance and often created opportunities for other types of attacks. More can and should be done in this area by the compiler community.

This paper presents such a compiler approach that simultaneously mitigates two types of attacks, namely a fault and a side-channel attacks. Continued development in this area using compiler techniques can further improve security.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Junjie Shen
    • 1
  • Zhi Chen
    • 1
  • Nahid Farhady Ghalaty
    • 2
  • Rosario Cammarota
    • 3
  • Alexandru Nicolau
    • 1
  • Alexander V. Veidenbaum
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaIrvineUSA
  2. 2.Accenture Cyber Security Technology LabsArlingtonUSA
  3. 3.Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.San DiegoUSA

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