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Simple Refreshing in the Noisy Leakage Model

  • Stefan Dziembowski
  • Sebastian Faust
  • Karol ŻebrowskiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11923)

Abstract

Masking schemes are a prominent countermeasure against power analysis and work by concealing the values that are produced during the computation through randomness. The randomness is typically injected into the masked algorithm using a so-called refreshing scheme, which is placed after each masked operation, and hence is one of the main bottlenecks for designing efficient masking schemes. The main contribution of our work is to investigate the security of a very simple and efficient refreshing scheme and prove its security in the noisy leakage model (EUROCRYPT’13). Compared to earlier constructions our refreshing is significantly more efficient and uses only n random values and \({<}2n\) operations, where n is the security parameter. In addition we show how our refreshing can be used in more complex masked computation in the presence of noisy leakage. Our results are established using a new methodology for analyzing masking schemes in the noisy leakage model, which may be of independent interest.

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Sonia Belaïd and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Sebastian Faust received funding from the German Federal Ministery of Education and Research and the Hessen State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity (CRISP). Additionally, he received funding from the Emmy Noether Program FA 1320/1-1 of the German Research Foundation (DFG) and by the VeriSec project 16KIS0634 from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Stefan Dziembowski and Karol Żebrowski received funding from the Foundation for Polish Science (grant agreement TEAM/2016-1/4) co-financed with the support of the EU Smart Growth Operational Programme (PO IR).

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Dziembowski
    • 1
  • Sebastian Faust
    • 2
  • Karol Żebrowski
    • 1
    Email author
  1. 1.University of WarsawWarsawPoland
  2. 2.TU DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany

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