An Analysis of Epistemic Peerhood

  • Kirk LougheedEmail author
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 51)


In the previous chapter I argued that there are significant differences between simple and complex cases of disagreement. In this chapter I analyze the strict notion of epistemic peerhood used throughout the epistemology of disagreement literature. Such notions typically involve the idea that agents are strict evidential and cognitive equals. I show that this notion rarely, if ever, obtains in cases of real-world disagreement. If this is true, then the sceptical threat to rational inquiry posed by strong conciliationism would evaporate. However, I conclude with a new account of epistemic peerhood that is broad enough to apply to many cases of real-world disagreement between inquirers, and yet not so permissive so as to lose the epistemic significance of disagreement.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Concordia University of EdmontonEdmontonCanada

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