Multi-dimensional Contract Incentive Design for Mobile Crowdsourcing Networks

  • Nan ZhaoEmail author
  • Menglin Fan
  • Chao Tian
  • Pengfei Fan
  • Xiao He
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems book series (LNNS, volume 97)


Through utilizing sensing and computing capabilities of mobile devices, mobile crowdsourcing network (MCN) can collect and analyze data in a cost-effective way. However, due to the selfishness of mobile devices, they may be reluctant to participate in crowdsourcing without additional incentives. In this paper, the incentive mechanism to encourage mobile devices’ participation in the multi-tasks of crowdsourcing is designed. By modelling MCN as a labour market, the crowdsourcing incentive mechanism is regarded as a moral hazard model under contract-based asymmetric information scenarios. Moreover, considering the interaction among crowdsourcing tasks, a multi-dimensional contract model is proposed. By evaluating mobile users’ performance, the service provider will reward and stimulate them to participate in crowdsourcing and work harder. Results demonstrate that the proposed contract has excellent performance in crowdsourcing incentives.


  1. 1.
    Jarrett, J., Saleh, I., Blake, M., Thorpe, S., Grandison T., Malcolm, R.: Mobile services for enhancing human crowdsourcing with computing elements. In: IEEE International Conference on Mobile Services, pp. 149–152 (2014)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Duan, L., Kubo, T., Sugiyama, K., Huang, J., Hasegawa, T., Walrand, J.: Incentive mechanisms for smartphone collaboration in data acquisition and distributed computing. In: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 1701–1709 (2012)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Zhao, N., Chen, Y., Liu, R., Wu, M., Xiong, W.: Monitoring strategy for relay incentive mechanism in cooperative communications networks. Comput. Electr. Eng. 60, 14–29 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., Liu, C.: Cooperative communication in cognitive radio networks under asymmetric information: a contract-theory based approach. Int. J. Distrib. Sens. Netw. 11, 1–11 (2015)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Qiu, T., Chen, B., Sangaiah, K.: A survey of mobile social networks: applications, social characteristics, and challenges. IEEE Syst. J. 12, 1–16 (2017)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Lu, J., Xin, Y., Zhang, Z., Liu, X., Li, K.: Game-theoretic design of optimal two-sided rating protocols for service exchange dilemma in crowdsourcing. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 13, 2801–2815 (2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gogo, A., Cybenko, G., Garmire, E.: A crowd sourced pharmacovigilance approach using SMS-based asymmetric encryption. In: International Multi-conference on Computing in the Global Information Technology, pp. 226–231 (2010)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Zhao, N., Fan, M., Tian, C., Fan, P.: Contract-based incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing networks. Algorithms 10, 1–13 (2017)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Wang, X., Umehira, M., Han, B., Li, P., Gu, Y., Wu, C.: Online incentive mechanism for crowdsourced radio environment map construction. In: IEEE International Conference on Communications, pp. 1–6 (2019)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Gao, L., Iosifidis, G., Huang, J., Tassiulas, L.: Hybrid data pricing for network-assisted user-provided connectivity. In: IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 682–690 (2014)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Ota, K., Dong, M., Gui, J., Liu, A.: QUOIN: incentive mechanisms for crowd sensing networks. IEEE Netw. 32, 1–6 (2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nan Zhao
    • 1
    Email author
  • Menglin Fan
    • 1
  • Chao Tian
    • 1
  • Pengfei Fan
    • 1
  • Xiao He
    • 1
  1. 1.Hubei University of TechnologyWuhanChina

Personalised recommendations