Internal Senses and Aristotle’s Cognitive Theory

  • Deborah ModrakEmail author
Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 22)


The question I plan to address is: Does Aristotle posit one or more internal senses in theorizing about perception and other types of sensory experience? My initial thought is that there are good reasons to be skeptical.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Depatment of PhilosophyUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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