A Pragmatic Model of Justification Based on “Material Inference” for Social Epistemology

  • Raffaela GiovagnoliEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 49)


Social epistemology presents different theories about the status of shared knowledge, but only some of them retain a fruitful relation with classical epistemology. The aim of my contribution is to present a pragmatic model which is, on the one side, related to the classical concepts of “truth” and “justification”, while, on the other side, addressing to a fundamentally “social” structure for the justification of knowledge. The shift from formal semantics to pragmatics is based on a notion of “material inference” embedding commitments implicit in the use of language, that favors the recognition of the social source of shared knowledge.


Social epistemology Truth Justification Material inference Deontic statuses Deontic attitudes 



I would like to thank Lorenzo Magnani and the participants to the MBR18-Spain for their fruitful comments. I am grateful to Matthieu Fontaine and the reviewers for their careful work and patience.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyPontifical Lateran UniversityVatican CityItaly

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