The Context-Priming of Conceptual Knowledge: RPEC and SPEC Models
There have been three viewpoints about the role of contexts played in the priming processes of conceptual knowledge: Some conceptual psychologists claim that priming effects of concepts are independent of any specific contexts; others contend that the core of concepts is activated automatically though the remainder is context-dependent; and recent studies show that all the properties contained in concepts are primed in specific contexts. This paper will propose two context-dependent models of priming conceptual knowledge, Referent-Priming-Effects in Context (RPEC) and Semantics-Priming-Effects in Context (SPEC), in order for a defense of the last view, namely the Context-Priming Hypothesis of Conceptual Knowledge. The first model indicates that there must be spatial and temporal connections between the priming and the primed items while the second reveals that there must be particular semantic connections between the priming and the primed. Thus the two models present two fundamental context-dependent modes of priming conceptual knowledge in spite of a variety of context-dependence.
The research work of this article was supported by a grant (18ZDA033) from the National Social Science Foundation of P.R. China.
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