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Conjuring Cognitive Structures: Towards a Unified Model of Cognition

  • Majid D. BeniEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 49)

Abstract

There are different philosophical views on the nature of scientific theories. Although New Mechanistic Philosophy (NMP) and Structural Realism (SR) are not rival theories strictly speaking, they reinterpret scientific theories by using different kinds of models. While NMP employs mechanistic models, SR depends on structural models to explicate the nature of theories and account for scientific representation. The paper demonstrates that different kinds of models used by NMP and SR result in quite different evaluations of the unificatory claims of a promising theory of cognitive neuroscience (the Free Energy theory). The structural realist construal provides a more charitable reading of the unificatory claims of the Free Energy Principle. Therefore, I conclude, it has an edge over NMP in the present context.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of History, Philosophy and Religious StudiesNazarbayev UniversityAstanaKazakhstan

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