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On Teaching Applied Formal Methods in Aerospace Engineering

  • Kristin Yvonne RozierEmail author
Conference paper
  • 221 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11758)

Abstract

As formal methods come into broad industrial use for verification of safety-critical hardware, software, and cyber-physical systems, there is an increasing need to teach practical skills in applying formal methods at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. In the aerospace industry, flight certification requirements like the FAA’s DO-178B, DO-178C, DO-333, and DO-254, along with a series of high-profile accidents, have helped turn knowledge of formal methods into a desirable job skill for a wide range of engineering positions. We approach the question of verification from a safety-case perspective: the primary teaching goal is to impart students with the ability to look at a verification question and identify what formal methods are applicable, which tools are available, what the outputs from those tools will say about the system, and what they will not, e.g., what parts of the safety case need to be provided by other means. We overview the lectures, exercises, exams, and student projects in a mixed-level (undergraduate/graduate) Applied Formal Methods course (Additional materials are available on the course website: http://temporallogic.org/courses/AppliedFormalMethods/) taught in an Aerospace Engineering department. We highlight the approach, tools, and techniques aimed at imparting a good sense of both the state of the art and the state of the practice of formal methods in an effort to effectively prepare students headed for jobs in an increasingly formal world.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Information on our recent work can be found at: http://laboratory.temporallogic.org. Thanks to the Aerospace Engineering departments at Iowa State University and the University of Cincinnati for their forward thinking in recognizing the need to develop such a course. AERE/COMS 407/507 was developed over the Spring 2017, and Fall 2017 and 2018 semesters at ISU; parts of the class were first developed during the Spring 2015 and 2016 semesters at UC. Thanks to all of the students who actively participated in those courses, especially for coming up with such fantastic half-semester projects. Some course materials were inspired by or directly derived from The TeachLogic Project (https://www.cs.rice.edu/~tlogic/); special thanks goes to Ian Barland, John Greiner, and Moshe Vardi for their brilliant teaching tools. Thanks to the NASA Langley Formal Methods Group for providing an excellent PVS course both in-person [6] and online with a rich collection of regularly-updated teaching materials. (https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/PVSClass2012/). Thanks to the many guest speakers including: Nikolaj Bjørner, Jonathan Hoffman, Yogananda Jeppu, César Muñoz, Lucas Wagner.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Iowa State UniversityAmesUSA

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