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A Formal Treatment of Hardware Wallets

  • Myrto Arapinis
  • Andriana Gkaniatsou
  • Dimitris KarakostasEmail author
  • Aggelos Kiayias
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11598)

Abstract

Bitcoin, being the most successful cryptocurrency, has been repeatedly attacked with many users losing their funds. The industry’s response to securing the user’s assets is to offer tamper-resistant hardware wallets. Although such wallets are considered to be the most secure means for managing an account, no formal attempt has been previously done to identify, model and formally verify their properties. This paper provides the first formal model of the Bitcoin hardware wallet operations. We identify the properties and security parameters of a Bitcoin wallet and formally define them in the Universal Composition (UC) Framework. We present a modular treatment of a hardware wallet ecosystem, by realizing the wallet functionality in a hybrid setting defined by a set of protocols. This approach allows us to capture in detail the wallet’s components, their interaction and the potential threats. We deduce the wallet’s security by proving that it is secure under common cryptographic assumptions, provided that there is no deviation in the protocol execution. Finally, we define the attacks that are successful under a protocol deviation, and analyze the security of commercially available wallets.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was partially supported by the EPSRC grant EP/P002692/1. Research also partly supported by the H2020 project FENTEC, No. 780108.

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Copyright information

© International Financial Cryptography Association 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Myrto Arapinis
    • 1
  • Andriana Gkaniatsou
    • 1
  • Dimitris Karakostas
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Aggelos Kiayias
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of EdinburghEdinburghUK
  2. 2.IOHKEdinburghUK

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