Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption

  • Thomas J. MiceliEmail author


This chapter extends the economic model of crime to include a dynamic element—given the reality that many criminals are repeat offenders. Several new issues arise in this context, including marginal deterrence, the possibility of redemption (or rehabilitation) of offenders, whether or not an offender’s criminal record should be considered in setting punishment for a current crime, and the role of prison in incapacitating dangerous repeat offenders. The parable of the Prodigal Son from the New Testament serves as a thematic point of departure for much of the discussion.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ConnecticutStorrs MansfieldUSA

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