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Public Choice Theory: Liberal Democracy’s Shortcomings and Their Institutional Market-Enhancing Solutions

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)

Abstract

This chapter presents the main arguments found in public choice literature concerning the shortcomings of liberal democracy and the potential market-enhancing solutions. In this sense, the chapter exposes the main arguments present in public choice theory supporting the general claim that markets are a desirable and suitable alternative to the failures of liberal democracy. The third chapter also assesses two potential market solutions for the problems of contemporary liberal democracies: the autocratic and the liberal solutions. Hence, this section searches for public choice insights on the suitability of the autocratic market solution. Finally, chapter three reveals the liberal market solution present in public choice literature, namely James Buchanan’s social contract and the general acknowledgement of market advantages over current liberal democratic choices.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Filipe Nobre Faria
    • 1
  1. 1.Nova University of LisbonLisbonPortugal

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